Herrlich - was da passiert - und das in Europa - wo sind jetzt die ganzen EU- Berater oder Politiker???
60 % Staatsverschuldung sind erlaubt lt. Verfassung, und auch dem IMF versprochen, wo die Weltbank vor der höchsten Balkan Verschuldung schon länger warnte. Peinlich die EBRD Bank, welche Kick Back Bestechungs Geschäfte machte in Tirana, welche mit über 2 Jahre Verspätung erst die Wirtschafts Daten korrigierte, was wir vor über 2 Jahren schon kommen sahen.Hinzu kommt der AlbPetrol Betrug, mit gefälschten Bank Garantien, wo man natürlich kein Geld erhält, was ein neue Pyramid Betrugs Show ist, des Salih Berisha und seiner Konsorten. Rezart Taci Tankstellen gibt es Viele in Albanien, oft sogar auf 3-400 Meter 3-4 Tankstellen, wo der Ökonomische Unfug und Betrug anfängt. Dummerweise haben diese Tankstellen praktisch keinerlei Kunden, was man ja selber leicht herausfinden kann.
29 Tetor, 2012 Ekonomi / Flash | nga AMA-News
Kaos total, shtet piramidë, borxhi shkon në 64 % !
Ajo qe pritej prej muajsh ka ndodhur. Qeveria nuk e kontrollon dot me borxhin, duke lejuar gropen e madhe ekonomike te vendit te zhytur ne borxhe te pafundme dhe me nje hije skandali si Albpetrol, i cili ende nuk i ka levruar parate per te mbylluir boshlleqet dhe ku vjen era nje tjeter megaskandal i fshehte ekonomik, pasi asgje nuk eshte transparente nese u paguan apo jo leket.
Ekonomia e vendit tonë pritet të përfshihet akoma më keq në vështirësi. Parashikimi i fundit i FMN-së tregon se për këtë vit (2012) borxhi publik, në raport me Prodhimin e Brendshëm Bruto, do të arrijë në 64 %.
Did Albania breach NATO security?
10/11/2010
The majority coalition in Albania’s parliament is upset at the opposition for going public with information suggesting Albania sold secret NATO information.
By Erl Murati for Southeast European Times in Tirana – 10/11/10
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/11/10/feature-04
Eugen Wohlfahrt zum Thema Wahlen: “denn die Hoffnung stirbt zuletzt", nachdem er Lefterie Lleshi besuchte.
Im Idioten Reich der “Sala” SHIK Ganoven: Lefterie Lleshi WIRD Wahl kommission Vorsitzende
Er glaubt wohl selber nicht den Unfug, denn er erzählt
Salih Berisha heuerte Gangster aus den USA an, für die Wahl Werbung. Salih Berisha, gibt Millionen aus für Lobbying und Werbung! Gangster die auch für Kabila im Kongo aktiv waren und heute für Rommey.
Stuart Stevens’ Shady Past Clients, Revealed
Penn Bullock
October 29, 2012 | 12:00 am 3 comments
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“I have a very good team of extraordinarily experienced, highly successful consultants, a couple of people in particular who have done races around the world,” said Mitt Romney at the now-infamous private fundraiser in Boca Raton where he attacked the “47 percent.” While those comments seized the country’s attention, these strange remarks largely escaped notice: “These guys in the U.S.—the Karl Rove equivalents—they do races all over the world, in Armenia, in Africa, in Israel,” he said. “They do these races, and they see which ads work, and which processes work best, and we have ideas about what we do over the course of the campaign.”
“I’d tell them to you,” Romney joked, “but I’d have to shoot you.”
For Romney to brag behind closed doors that his consultants are using tactics honed in foreign elections is peculiar, to say the least. The well-traveled consultants he praised were almost certainly his chief strategist, Stuart Stevens, and Stevens’ longtime sidekick, Russ Schriefer. And before taking charge of Romney’s presidential campaign as its “Karl Rove equivalent,” Stevens helped lift at least two foreign strongmen into power, guiding them to victory in elections rife with irregularities and violence.
Stevens, whom The New Republic profiled in August, says he relishes politics “for the smell of napalm in the morning,” and, by his own admission, his political work is driven by something like a sublimated aggression—it provides “an outlet for my violent tendencies.” An article last month in Politico that portrayed Stevens as the target of vicious sniping within the campaign mentioned in passing that he worked in Albania and the Congo. But it didn’t name the leaders whose campaigns he ran: Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha and Congolese President Joseph Kabila, authoritarian figures who have alarmed human rights groups and, at times, the U.S. State Department.
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The depth of Stevens’ involvement in the campaigns of Berisha and Kabila is evident from the LinkedIn profile of Joel Frushone, a former deputy at Stevens’ consulting firm, the Stevens & Schriefer Group. His resume says the firm managed almost every aspect of their election bids, from “high level multimedia campaigns” to “fundraising,” “policy development,” “in-depth opposition research,” and “political strategy, media plans and tactics”—virtually the same services Stevens provides Romney.
Frushone offered only a brief comment. “I know the intimate details of what we did there,” he said, “and it was all above board.”
According to an insider from the 2005 Albanian campaign, Stevens was recommended to Berisha by a Bosnian middleman, Damir Fazlic, whom the U.S. State Department has described as “shady.” (State Department cables say Fazlic worked closely with Berisha on the campaign and received legal protection from his government. He has been followed in the Eastern European press by rumors of mafia ties. He did not reply to requests for comment.) Stevens was joined in Albania by a consort from Washington’s BGR Group, and the Americans had their work cut out for them: Berisha’s image needed serious rehab. His previous reign over Albania had ended in a surreal, almost apocalyptic catastrophe.
As an apparatchik in the country’s former Stalinist dictatorship, Berisha rode a democratic uprising to the presidency in the early 1990s and imposed a right-wing, one-party regime. While secret police kept order, monumental pyramid schemes grew to consume much of the GDP. When they crashed in 1997, Albania plunged into violent anarchy. Girding for civil war, Berisha surrounded himself with a paramilitary gang as his party handed out guns at campaign offices. In late 1997, he resigned under intense international and American pressure. The violence killed an estimated 2,000 people.
When Stevens was hired to resell Berisha’s leadership to the Albanian populace in 2005, Berisha’s image at home and abroad was that of a washed-up despot. Audaciously, Stevens and the BGR specialists set about crafting a platform based almost entirely on a pledge to reduce corruption. Thus, one of Eastern Europe’s most unsavory ex-rulers was resurrected as a crusading reformer.
Stevens framed Berisha as an agent of grand, visionary change. In a presentation at Albania’s Sheraton Hotel that was reported by a local newspaper, he insisted that Berisha embodied American values just like George W. Bush did. Berisha himself stepped forward to say something nice about Stevens. Stevens, said the candidate, was his campaign’s “magician,” and he and Stevens worked together like “Siamese twins.”
An opposition figure in Albania, Erion Veliaj, who leads a small left-wing party and a youth activist group that has received American funding, said in a telephone interview that Stevens played dirty during the campaign. Shortly before the election, Veliaj told reporters that he received a threatening phone call from one of Berisha’s consultants. At the time, he did not identify the caller. Today, he says it was Stevens. Veliaj says Stevens “went berserk,” demanding he withhold the results of a poll commissioned with help from the British and Dutch embassies and conducted by Gallup International (which is unrelated to America’s Gallup organization). The poll showed an uncomfortably close race for Berisha. According to Veliaj, Stevens said he would use his influence in Washington to cut off future U.S. visas for Veliaj if he didn’t scrap the poll. Veliaj released it.
“He struck me as a cheap bluffer,” Veliaj says.
Gary Kokalari, an Albanian-American activist (and Romney supporter), says Veliaj told him about the confrontation at the time. Kokalari says he called Stevens to tell him to “back off.”
Berisha won the election in July 2005 by a five-percent margin, but monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe called the election a “disappointment,” saying it failed to comply with international standards because of “serious irregularities,” intimidation, vote-buying and “violence committed by extremists on both sides.”
Since the election, the Economist Intelligence Unit in London, which tracks world governments, has continued to classify Albania as a hybrid of authoritarianism and democracy, and Berisha’s government has birthed lurid scandals. In 2008, on a secretly recorded phone call, an American arms dealer complained that his scheme to sell illegal ammo from Albanian junkyards to the U.S. Army had become entangled in an Albanian “mafia” involving Berisha and his son. When protesters were shot dead outside Albania’s parliament last year, Berisha claimed they were trying to launch a coup with guns disguised as umbrellas and pens and called the independent prosecutor investigating their deaths a “boulevard whore.” And when the newspaper that reported on Stevens’ loving speech at the Sheraton Hotel ran afoul of Berisha after the 2005 election, it was briefly shut down by police, and its publisher’s car firebombed, in an incident condemned by the Committee to Protect Journalists.
Though Berisha has remained a close American ally under the Obama administration—and even joined NATO four years ago—a 2010 State Department cable written by the U.S. ambassador warned that Berisha was attempting to rebuild a secret police force and, along with the Socialist opposition, evinced “an authoritarian streak.” Since leaving his post in Albania, the ex-ambassador, John Withers, has become one of Berisha’s most vocal critics, accusing him of driving Albanian democracy into the ground since his return to power in 2005. His leadership has run “exactly contrary to democracy-building,” Withers said in an interview with Albanian media in March. His government “has routinely bullied the courts … striven to curtail media freedoms through restrictive and undemocratic laws,” manipulated the electoral process, and “shown an active, even obsessive interest in only one objective: the pursuit of power by any means at its disposal.”
After his triumph electing Berisha, Stevens went to work on a 2006 election in the Democratic Republic of Congo. By then, Kabila had been in power for four years, after assuming the presidency upon his father’s assassination. Though he ruled by diktat, he also held promise as a reformer, helping negotiate a partial end to an immense regional war and passing a liberal constitution.
In the run-up to the election, however, human rights groups began protesting a campaign of suppression waged by Kabila’s government against the opposition. A Human Rights Watch report detailed violent incidents. In one raid, “agents of the special police” stormed a Christian television station, arresting a pastor critical of the political process, beating technicians and destroying the broadcasting equipment. The government also imprisoned a journalist for “insulting the head of state,” and soldiers routinely shot protesters.
As The Economist put it at the time, Kabila was “making full use of his control of the security services and his monopoly of the state media” to secure the election. But, “leaving nothing to chance,” and lest his security forces and media monopoly prove insufficiently persuasive, he had hired the Stevens and Schriefer Group. “As Mr. Kabila starts campaigning at rallies, the Stevens and Schriefer Group’s slogans, television advertisements and mobile cinemas are being dispatched to every corner of Congo,” said the magazine.
Shortly before the election, the leading opposition figure, Etienne Tshisekedi, dropped out of the race, insisting it was rigged in advance. Kabila’s main challenger then became one of his own vice-presidents, a former warlord who would later be tried for war crimes in an international court. Kabila won the election by a wide margin. When the results were announced, however, there was tension and sporadic violence in the capital, with fears the country would fall into civil war. His challenger ultimately conceded, and despite irregularities the United Nations declared the election a success for a country that hadn’t seen a vote in decades.
Though there were “an awful lot of irregularities,” Tom Turner, an expert on the Congo with Amnesty International, said he believed Kabila was probably the lesser of two evils in the election—emphasizing that it was the withdrawal of the most credible opposition candidate that left voters with no palatable alternative. Turner also suggested Stevens overlooked human rights abuses in view of his contractual obligation to win.
“If you’re doing propaganda—if I can use that term as neutrally as possible—and some human rights abuses are directed at journalists, political parties and human rights organizations, you have kind of a conflict of interest,” he said.
Though Stevens’ firm produced a campaign film promising the Congolese people a brighter future under Kabila’s leadership, almost immediately after the election Kabila unleashed a wave of slaughter and mass arrest that prompted Foreign Policy magazine to label him the “new Mobutu,” referring to the infamous megalomaniac who ruled Congo for the latter part of the 20th century. Since the election, the magazine said, “Kabila’s regime has amassed one of the world’s worst human rights records.”
A Human Rights Watch dossier in 2008 alleged that Kabila’s government killed “an estimated 500 people and detained about 1,000 more, many of whom have been tortured, in the two years since elections that were meant to bring democracy … Some were kept chained for days or weeks and many were forced to sign confessions saying they had been involved in coup plots against Kabila.” When Kabila was reelected late last year, the State Department dismissed the vote as “seriously flawed” and a “disappointment,” and a UN fact-finding mission shortly afterward confirmed his government has tortured and disappeared political opponents….. http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/109214/stuart-stevens-shady-past-clients-revealed
Alles ist im Chaos!
Eduard Beluga, ein vorheriger Adviser des Ministers, wurde vor 2 Jahren festgenommen, und ist seitdem verschollen. Viele bekannte Firmen haben das Land verlassen.
Raporti i KLSH për Albpetrolin
26/10/2012 23:29
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Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit pas një periudhe 15 mujore, që nis prej datës 31/12/2010 deri më 30/3/2012”, ka publikuar raportin e auditimit të kompanisë së nxjerrjes së naftës Albetrol Sh.a, ku vë re një seri shkeljesh për të cilat propozon edhe masa konkrete, kallëzime penale dhe masa administrative.
KLSH i klasifikon shkeljet ligjore në katër pika.
Në të parën Kontrolli i Lartë i Shtetit thekson pafuqishmërinë e plotë të Ministrisë së Ekonomisë dhe strukturave drejtuese të Albpetrol në zbatimin e marrëveshjeve të hidrokarbureve të lidhura me kompanitë e huaja.
Raporti thotë se administrata e Albpetrolit nuk ka mundur të ushtrojë autoritetin që ka për vlerësimin dhe zhvillimin e zonave të kontratave, duke pranuar dhe miratuar në vazhdimësi të gjitha kërkesat e bëra, të cilat në përgjithësi kanë qenë nga viti në vit me devijime të theksuara nga marrëveshjet.
Si pasojë KLSH konstaton se detyrimi total i kompanive të huaja që operojnë në bazë të Marrëveshjeve Hidrokarbure deri në fund të muajit Prill 2012 është në vlerën 38 199 500 USD , ku detyrimi me i madh financiar i perket Bankers Petroleum Albania Ltd” që llogaritet në vlerën 30 221 000 USD, duke vijuar me “Stream Oil&Gas Ltd” në 6 744 075 USD për naftën dhe për gazin 2.4 milion USD.
Kompania “Sherëood International Petroleum, Ltd”, në vlerën 216 890 USD për naftën. Kompania “IEC Visoka Inc” 1 018 100 USD për naftën.
KLSH thotë se i gjithë ky detyrim ka ardhur si pasojë edhe e paaftësisë së Albpetrolit për të siguruar vend-depozitat e naftës, problem i cili nuk ka gjetur zgjidhje.
Në pikën ku nënvizohet Gjendja e debitorëve dhe kreditorëve si dhe zbatimi i ligjshmërisë për inventarizimin e pasurisë KLSH vë re se ARMO Sh.a është debitori më i madh kundrejt Albpetrol Sh.a me shumën 5 ,374,445,691 lekë. Për këtë KLSH rekomandon masa për mbledhjen e detyrimit financiar, duke ndjekur të gjitha procedurat e nevojshme administrative dhe të gjitha shkallët e gjykimit, per arkëtimin e borxhit nga kompania ARMO, dhe kompanite e tjera debitore ndaj Albetrol, që në total kapin shifrën e detyrimit financiar kundrejt kompanisë së vetme të nxjerrjes së naftës në vend në 90 milionë dollarë.
http://www.top-channel.tv/artikull.php?id=244886
Gary Kokalary: Bei der AlbPetrol Privatisierung wurde eine gefälschte Bank Garantie hinterlegt